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Abstract: This paper discusses the comparative legal reasoning of Asy Syatibi 
and Gustav Radbruch in their philosophical basis framework. By using a 
comparative analysis of reasoning models, both examine the influence 
between philosophical modalities and legal reasoning models developed by 
both legal theorists. The results of the research show that the ontological 
stance of Asy Syatibi is identical to transcendental-based foundationalism, 
while Gustav Radbruch positions himself on transcendental idealism. 
Meanwhile, the identification of epistemological modalities Asy Syatibi is 
more inclined to internal coherence, while Gustav Radbruch is influenced by 
the flow of methodical dualism and empirical realism. As for his axiological 
modality, Asy Syatibi is much influenced by maqashid ethics as a legal goal, 
while Gustav Radbruch is influenced by deontic ethics. 
 
Keywords: substantive induction, maqashid ethics, coherentism, methodical 
dualism, deontic ethics. 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between reasoning and law is one of the central 
themes in the legal science discourse. Operationally reasoning is an attempt 
to apply formal logic to compile and test the validity of inference, then the law 
is located as a premise that expresses the predicate to act in accordance with 
the legal order (Prakken, H, 1997:15-31).  
Bernard Arief Shidarta highlighted legal reasoning as the basis for 
juridical argumentation that most often faces obstacles, especially when the 
legal event being faced is unclear. Besides that, legal reasoning is responsible 
for presenting juridical argumentsthe most acceptable so that there is nogap 
between law and justice. (Shidarta, B. A., 2013:25-26).  
The gap of law and justice cannot be separated from the legal 
reasoning model that develops internally within the science of law itself, 
bearing in mind that legal reasoning is a very practical instrument but is still 
demanded to accommodate social problems in society. The gap between the 
vision of justice and morals with the vision of legal certainty above represents 
many philosophical problems in the science of law that are increasingly 
urgent to be resolved.(Shidarta, S, 2013: 5-6).  
Legal reasoning in Indonesia has so far relied on the logic of syllogism, 
even though the legal events faced are not all linear with existing legal 
provisions. Even legal events are more often found to be more complex and 
complicated than those stipulated in legal material because they are 
intertwined with social and cultural motives. Under these conditions, 
juridical facts as a minor premise in the syllogistic reasoning system cannot 
simply be applied, contextualization of facts to the relevant legal rules is still 
needed (Widodo Dwi Putro, 2011: 28-30). 
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 The weakness of syllogism as a model of legal reasoning has been 
reminded since the 1980s by Roeslan Saleh, he mentioned it in terms of 
"juridical automation" (Roeslan, 1983: 30). This happens because every 
premise that forms deductive inference is seen to have the nature of self-
evident truth so that conclusions have been completed by things that are 
objective and universal. This is one reason why syllogism is called closed 
reasoning (Anshori, 2018: 88). 
The reasoning system with the closed system above gave birth to the 
phenomenon of the separation of the legal ethical vision with its normative 
vision. Legal products, especially judicial decisions, tend to emphasize 
certainty, rather than justice and expediency. This separation is inevitably 
bringing legal knowledge to the verge of scientific dysfunction. 
 The inability of legal reasoning to respond to increasingly swift social 
dynamics can be understood in connection with the increasing number of 
traces of inequality inherited by syllogistic reasoning. This demand is felt 
even stronger when connected with the insistence that legal reasoning is 
oriented towards centripental motion so that the resulting legal spectrum is 
not merely formal juridical nuances, but also reflects the Law of God 
(Alkostar, 2018: 54). 
Looking at the gaps in legal certainty and justice, this paper intends to 
compare the legal reasoning of Imam Asy Syatiby (Asy Syatibi: Vol. 2: 39), 
and Gustav Radbruch (Leawoods, 2000). Both were chosen based on objective 
factors, namely both Asy Syatibiy and Gustav Radbruch are legal theorists 
who are not satisfied with the legal reasoning based on deductive syllogism. 
Asy Syatibi is known for his istiqra ma'nawy legal reasoning model, and 
Gustav Radbruch is known as the idee des recht (Purpose of the Law) (Wolf, 
1958). 
Both of them represent friendly legal reasoning models with 
theological concepts although with varying portions so that they become 
relevant for the development of legal reasoning in Indonesia which requires 
justice with a Divine dimension. 
The interconnection study of legal reasoning from the two theoretical 
above is very important because the comparative law can encourage the 
expansion of the meaning of law (legal extrapolation) by connecting the 
similarities and differences in scientific perspectives that develop in each 
school of continental law and Islamic law(Erick Wolf, 1958). 
 Based on the background description above, what will become the 
subject of the writing is how is the comparison of Asy Syatibi and Gustav 
Radbruch's legal reasoning models viewed from the philosophical basis of 
reasoning? 
 
Research methods 
 The theoretical framework used to analyze the problem statement 
above refers to the legal reasoning model contained in the flow of analytic and 
normative legal philosophy with the cohenrentism and foundationalism 
perspective reasoning model as a reference to identify the basic 
characteristics of reasoning law which are the objects of research in this 
article namely Imam Asy Syatibi and Gustac Radbruch. 
 Comparative analysis between the reasoning models of Asy Syatibi 
and Gustav Radbruch begins with the philosophical modalities contained 
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therein, namely ontological, epistemological, and axiological (Shidarta, 
2013:125). Departing from the philosophical modality, an explanation will be 
seen as intended by Sunarjati Hartono as a point of equality and point of 
difference in the comparison of law. Including solving a problem that is the 
same scientific issue in the world of law (Hartono, 1991: 5).  
 
Disscussion and Result 
Legal Reasoning Based on Philosophy of Al-Syatibi (d.790 H/1388 M) 
Asy Syatibi's reasoning is strongly influenced by his theory of 
maqashid (the purpose of law). Asy Syatibi points to a number of ontological 
and epistemological modalities that are relatively different from their 
predecessors, especially Ibn Hazm. Asy-Syatibi responded to the theory of 
Islamic law that emerged in the eighth century Hijriyah which highlighted 
the logic of infant law. Asy Syatibi criticizes this model of reasoning because 
in binary opposition opposes the omission as the goal of law and the text of 
revelation as the normativity of Islamic law (Moosa,2011). 
The genealogical reading of the ontological position of Asy Syatibi can 
be known based on his view that the fundamental premise in legal reasoning 
must be something clear and tested for certainty (qath'i) (Hallaq, W, 1997: 
206). Therefore, the ontological modality built by Al-Syatibi is essentially 
based on the principles of foundationalism. Asy Syatibi offers the method of 
istiqra ma'nawy or sub-induction which is claimed to be able to combine the 
scriptures and the hadith of the Prophet with the benefit as a universal 
premise in the formation of law. According to Asy Syatibi Sharia law is based 
on the principle of public interest (mashlahah).(Asy Syatibi, Vol. 2:10). 
Therefore the istiqra 'ma'nawy method is structured not only as a logical 
operational framework but also to achieve what Asy Syatibi calls 
epistemological certainty (Moosa, 2011). 
Related to Asy Syatibi's epistemological certainty project, Thaha Abd 
al-Rahman argued that Asy Syatibi was very eager to complement the infant 
reason (text) which had so far adopted the deductive model with benefit as a 
general legal objective. 
The istiqra ma'nawy project connects the principles of the verses of the 
Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet in the context of inductive reasoning so 
that the two sacred sources of text are factually connected with benefit as 
epistemic supremacy in Islamic law. The validity of Asy Syatibi's law in the 
context of istiqra ma'nawy , found with cumulative readings that produce 
epistemological certainty. 
To achieve this goal, Asy Syatibi relates it to the sources of the 
revelation and the hadith of the Prophet on a particular topic, then evaluates 
and considers the cumulative messages collected in the sources of the text. 
(Thaha, 2020, 41). The cumulative message set allows it to comprehensively 
assess the meaning of law that is connected with the purpose of the law, then 
adopt it in a certain legal hierarchy from the highest level of certainty to the 
lowest (Thaha, 2020, 41). 
The position of the Qur'anic verses and the hadith of the Prophet in 
the context of istiqra ma'nawy according to Asy Syatibimust be seen in the 
historical spectrum of Mecca and Medina. The spectrum of Makkah 
represents universal claims while the second is elaboration and refinement of 
the Meccan verses (Thaha, 2020, 41).Asy Syatibi'sexploration of the text of 
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the revelation placed him as a legal reasoner who dared to explore the law of 
the Qur'an (text) in a historical container. A model of reasoning that is not 
very populist among Zahiri Schools. According to him, legal typology is 
recognized based on the type of group of verses of madaniyah law and verses 
ofmakkiyah law. The makkiyah verses refer to universal or basic norms and 
are the aims of Islamic law(Asy Syatibi, Vol. 4: 236).The Madaniyyah verses 
refer to substantive law as a guide for the practical application of the 
universal value of the makkiyah verses in detail (Asy Syatibi, Vol. 4: 236). 
Asy Syatibi argues that law is bound by its axiological purpose to 
protect the five basic human benefits: religion, life, religion, property 
(ownership) and rationality. According to him, these basic interests are 
universal legal postulates.(Asy Syatibi, Vol. 2:10).These five basic benefits 
show Asy Syatibi's effort to replace hermeneutical deductive reasoning with 
self-evident premises even though they are not connected with general benefit 
as the main goal in Islamic law. 
Although Asy Syatibi did not completely reject the deductive legal 
reasoning system that is prevalent among legal experts such as Ibn Hazm, 
the maqashidasy shari'ah project shows Asy Syatibi's strong desire to reduce 
its use in Islamic law (Sheehi, 2000: 130). 
The foundation of Asy Syatibi's reasoning is also known that there are 
basic norms as often appear in Kelsen's and HL Hart's research, but what 
distinguishes them is in Asy Syatibi's thinking the outermost circle of law is 
regulation, because the relation between basic norms and legal objectives 
takes place in a dialogic rather than subordinated (Asy Syatibi, Vol. 2:284). 
Discourse (maqashid) as a moral discourse in Islamic law consists of 
three concentric maslahat, dharuriyah (primary), hajiyah (secondary) and 
tahsiniyyah (complementary) circles (Asy Syatibi: Vol 4: 42). The hierarchy 
oflegal objectives in Asy Syatibi's moral discourse reinforces his 
epistemological position as adherents of coherentism. Hisdesire for 
coherentism is a middle ground so that infant reasoning as a closedsystem of 
reasoning can dialogue with dialogical reasoning. 
Asy Syatibi's epistemological position as a coherentist increasingly 
emphasized his criticism of the fuqaha (juris) for ignoring the universal 
principles of the Makkiyah verses and ignoring the inductive method 
(burhani reasoning) associated with the new culture (Asy Syatibi, Vol. 4: 238). 
In short, Asy Syatibi discovered the normative basis of Sharia which is rooted 
in human reason and social standard practice of cultural reference (Masud, 
1970). 
 
Legal Reasoning Based on Philosophy of Gustav Radburuch (1878-1949) 
The modality of Gustav Radbruch's legal reasoning is known based on 
his main work rechtsphilosophie as compiled by Edwin W. Petterson. In his 
work, the ontological dualism position of Radbruch's reasoning starts from his 
belief in the nature of the world of human experience consisting of combined 
reality and values. Radbruch explains that there are differences between 
values that are not visible, value-related, value conquests, and evaluating 
attitudes (Spaak, 2008: 261-290). The invisible value is a scientific attitude in 
the natural science approach that focuses on physical reality without 
evaluating it. The attitude of evaluating the focus with the relation between 
one value with another value (Spaak, 2008: 262).He continued that according 
LEGAL REASONING COMPARATIVE …ISMAN  
 
 
 53 
to these four types of attitudes, we can divide the viewpoint of knowledge 
based on four different categories: existence, value, meaning, and essence 
(Patterson (ed.), 1950, 43-224). 
These four categories show that Radbruch's ontological modality is 
focused on reasoning towards abstract, ideal, independent concerns in the 
relationship of prediction. These characteristics then become the foundation 
for Radbruch to combine three legal objectives namely justice, certainty, and 
expediency. 
Radbruch then compiles the ontological modality by introducing three 
different approaches to understanding the law: (i) evaluative views, (ii) views 
related to relations between values, and (iii) views related to the conquest of 
values (Spaak, 2008: 262). This perspective was born from a combination of 
methodical dualism and relativism (Patterson (ed.), 1950: 43–224). Methodist 
dualism stems from neo-kantian teachings which believe that truth is not 
determined by its existence or simply because if it will exist / not exist. Neo 
Kantian even considers that there is no logical connection between das sollen 
and das sein (Istijab, 2019: 90). Therefore, the evaluation of the law is not 
based on the material and substance of the law, but rather the aims and 
ideals of the law (idee des recht).( Brian, 2019: 93). 
Meanwhile, the relativist method is used by Radbruch as the principle 
that the truth of das sollen (what should be) is not due to its compatibility 
with das sein (what is actually) but is determined by another das sollen 
(Istijab, 2019: 93). This statement shows the great passion of Gustav 
Radbruch for reasoning in the Neo-Kantianism (Samekto, 2015: 11-17). 
The conception of moral relativism led Gustav Radbruch to his most 
famous axiological modality of justice as the basic idea of law. In terms of 
justice Radbruch argues that the separation of law and morality facilitates 
Hitler's cruelty.The legal positivism adopted in the German legal system 
during Hitler's reign in Germany made the legal system helpless against the 
arbitrariness of power (Tyler, 2020) 
Based on the description above it can be seen that the ontological 
modality built by Radbruch is transcendental idealism. The ontological 
modality that stands diametrically with empirical realism. Transcendental 
idealism is a form of direct (non-inferential) knowledge and certain 
knowledge about the existence of objects in space only through self-awareness 
(Stang, 2016). 
The notion of transcendental idealism above demonstrates Kant's 
legacy of Radbruch's thinking about legality and morality. Moral attitude 
based on intuition is autonomous, whereas moral attitude which is originally 
intended to obey the rules that come from outside and personal is called 
heteronomy (Dryden, 2003). 
Based on the ontological modalities mentioned above, Radbruch 
explained that legal justice is not related to the right and wrong of an action, 
but rather relates to the moral autonomy possessed by each individual and 
regardless of the circumstances and consequences of the act. The form of 
justice mentioned above is a continuation of the deontic ethics doctrine which 
understands that the determination of prohibited and permitted actions is 
determined based on the moral goals to be achieved not based on the 
pleasure, satisfaction and happiness of individuals understood in 
teleleological ethics and consecualism. The strength of the basic values of 
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justice which is rooted in deontic ethics because it provides support for the 
value of the law to assess the moral position so that a person does work is not 
limited to his moral obligations but beyond his obligations and position. 
(Alexander & Moore 2016) 
But the most striking weak point in deontic ethics is its uncertainty in 
resolving the moral paradox that occurs because the non-consequentialist 
model of rationality requires "action to produce the best rational 
consequences. Deontic ethics does not provide conceptual resources to escape 
the moral paradox (Alexander, & Moore, 2016). Moral paradox in this context 
is when moral obligations conflict with other moral interests, such as carrying 
out obligations that violate the protection of the rights of others. 
 
Conclusion 
This article explores the legal reasoning of Asy Syatibi and Gustav 
Radbruch with a focus on three philosophical modalities as the basis of 
reasoning. Related to the ontological modality Asy Syatibi seems to base his 
substantive induction reasoning (istiqra ma'nawy) on transcendental 
foundationalism, while Gustav Radbruch positions himself on transcendental 
idealism. Meanwhile, in his epistemological modality review, Asy Syatibi was 
more inclined to use internal coherence, while Gustav Radbruch was 
influenced by methodical dualism. As for the axiological aspect, Asy Syatibi 
was influenced by maqashid shar'iah as a legal goal, while Gustav Radbruch 
based himself on deontic ethics. 
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